

LEVINAS AND THE SAMURAI: A LEVINASIAN ANALYSIS OF MILITARY ETHICS OF SERVICE.

This article discusses the theoretical implications of Emmanuel Levinas's philosophy upon traditional military ethics of service. Throughout the discussion Japanese Bushido is used as an example to provide a specific, practical characterization of such an ethic upon which to apply a Levinasian analysis. Levinas's phenomenology and his idea of "ethics as first philosophy" are briefly outlined, and then a comparison is made between these ideas and more traditional ethics relating to the military such as Bushido and the Just War tradition. The conclusion is reached that a traditional ethic of service that requires a soldier to perpetrate acts of violence against others on command is profoundly unethical in Levinasian terms, but that Levinasian ethics leaves open the possibility of a soldier as one who defends others rather than operates as a living weapon on the orders of a state.

The aim of this article is to discuss the ramifications of Emmanuel Levinas' philosophy for traditional military ethics of service. We will examine the extent to which Levinas's ideas are compatible with a military ethic, if they are at all, and whether or not they could conceivably form a basis for a military ethic as normally understood.

In order to assist with the extrapolation of Levinas' ideas to a more traditional ethical discussion, we will use Japanese Bushido as an example of a traditional ethic of duty and military service. Bushido has been chosen for this essay for several reasons: Firstly, it is a clear example of an ethics of service that was practised for many hundreds of years, including well into the 20th century. Unlike Nazism, Bushido is a philosophy that has not been much discussed in the west. It is highly doubtful whether or not this essay could add anything to the extensive discussion of Nazism, the *Shoah*, and Levinasian ethics that is already available, but it is possible Bushido could be usefully employed in a discussion of Levinasian ethics in a way that is novel.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it will be argued that Bushido completely lacks a coherent ethical basis from a Levinasian standpoint. It is perhaps as clear an example of an unethical ethic in Levinasian terms as could be found. This emptiness at the core of the ethic is perhaps responsible for the shocking crimes perpetrated apparently in cold blood by Japanese soldiers in the twentieth century.

As Levinas's thought hinges upon a certain attitude of openness and flexibility, it can be resistant to extrapolation into concrete situations. In this essay Bushido will be used as a sort of foil to help elucidate Levinas's ideas. In order to do this though we first need a brief discussion of how Levinas justifies his idea of "ethics as first philosophy", or ethics being prior to ontology in terms of both temporal emergence and importance.

For Levinas, the Other is pure abstraction, that which is outside of and prior to being. The Other is what ultimately constitutes each of us as subjects. Without the Other we drift in a world like insomniacs, organized or totalised into a comprehensible whole by our consciousness. It is only when this consciousness encounters the Other through the medium of face to face contact that we become aware that there are other beings who can never be completely totalised, and the totalitarianism of our consciousness is shattered (Morgan, 2007, pg.41). *Otherwise Than Being*, Levinas's last major philosophical work, describes this event and shows its ramifications for philosophy and for traditional understandings of ethics. For the remainder of this discussion the term "Other" will be used to mean the abstract Other, and "the other" beings that are not the self.

The way in which the other interrupts subjects is for Levinas the evidence for the prioritisation of ethics in philosophy. He characterizes this interruption as the self being invoked or summoned, called into being by a demand from the other. Since this demand is what causes beings to come into existence, and words are expressions of beings, it is useless to use words to describe the summons. It is a wordless and fundamental demand that we cannot ignore, but Levinas characterizes it metaphorically as "Thou Shalt Not Kill."

This is the demand of the other to be nourished and aided, an accusation that singles us out. Levinas characterizes it as a responsibility, but not in exactly the sense normally understood.

Levinasian responsibility is more like response-ability, the inability to ignore the other. At the moment we encounter the other we also encounter the Other. The self experiences what Levinas calls proximity, a sensation of the nearness of another that even when in direct contact maintains an awareness of alterity, the Otherness of the other. At this point, before being has emerged, we cannot choose, we can only respond. We do this in a process which Levinas calls substitution:

“Vulnerability, exposure to outrage, to wounding, passivity more passive than all patience, passivity of the accusative form, trauma of accusation suffered by a hostage who substitutes himself for the others; all this is the self, a defecting or defeat of the ego's identity. And this, pushed to the limit, is sensibility, sensibility as the subjectivity of the subject. It is a substitution for another, one in the place of another, expiation (Levinas, 2008, pg. 15).”

We offer to the Other sensed in the other all of our being, all of our resources, even the bread from our own mouths, though we know that we can never completely sate the hunger of the Other. This is substitution.

After this shock of accusation and response, the self returns from substitution to its previous totality, marked with a trace, a birth-scar in the self's totality that in it's inability to be recalled recalls other interruptions and other summons. As it moves away, the subject treats the other, like others previously encountered, and the newly re-created self begins to absorb and codify the other as a being within its totality, an other that unlike the Other, can be understood. The self remembers that there are beings all around, and from this point on we have entered the ontic realm. It should be noted that all of this temporal talk of “remembering” and “previous encounters” is figurative: Substitution occurs outside being and therefore outside subjective time. In fact, proximity creates the subject's subjective sense of time:

This passivity is that of an attachment that has already been made, as something irreversibly past, prior to all memory and all recall. It was made at an irrecoverable time which the present, represented in recall,

does not equal, in a time of birth or creation, in which nature or creation retains a trace, unconvertible into a memory (Levinas 2008 p. 105)

By creating a diachrony between the non-time of the original ethical demand, a time that cannot be returned to, and conscious memory, subjective time is born.

What Levinas is describing in *Otherwise Than Being* is a placing of responsibility that creates the possibility of freedom because it takes place transcendently, i.e. crosses the boundary between being and being's other (Levinas, 2008, p. 3). He describes the main thesis of the work succinctly in this passage:

“Signification, the-one-for-the-other, the relationship with alterity, has been analysed in the present work as proximity, proximity as responsibility for the other, and responsibility for the other as substitution. In its subjectivity, its very bearing as a separate substance, the subject was shown to be an expiation for another, the condition or unconditionality of being hostage (Levinas, 2008, p. 184).”

Levinas describes the primordial event of the Other's formation of the self in poetic or prophetic language. By demonstrating that the event that draws beings out of the passivity of totality is an accusation or demand inspired by being's Other and present in proximity, he has assured that ethics is first philosophy.

Levinas's work hints at the tendency for subjects to reduce the alterity of the Other to an idea or a signification that can be more readily engaged with, and that this reduction or turning away from alterity is in effect a decision to act unethically. In order to harm an other, we must first absorb them into our totality so completely that we can fail to act in response to the call of alterity, the Other behind their face. It is important to note that alterity can never be completely ignored

according to Levinas – since ethics inspires phenomena it follows that there is always the possibility of ethics in the phenomenological world.

This brings us to a sketch of what ethics in the ordinary sense (i.e. acts in the world and the search for what is good) may mean for Levinas. In order to behave ethically in a Levinasian sense it is necessary to continue to respond to the Other, to not totalise an other to the extent that you ignore their pleas for mercy, their demand not to be harmed. This necessity to always leave an opening for the interruption of alterity is for Levinas an ethical necessity, and is the heart of his ethical thought. The following passage from *Otherwise Than Being* illustrates Levinas's contention:

“For the little humanity that adorns the earth, a relaxation of essence to the second degree is needed in the just war waged against war, to tremble and shudder at every instant because of this justice (Levinas, 2008, p. 185).”

By “relaxation of essence” Levinas means a relaxation of totalisation, a deliberate openness to ethical demands.

Military ethics on the other hand, and Bushido in particular, do not work according to this principle. Modern western Just War theory works on an assumption that there are legitimate and illegitimate targets, and the requirement to attack legitimate targets is what differentiates a combatant from a non-combatant (MacMahan, 2009, p. 8). As long as a combatant attacks only legitimate targets he is abiding by the venerable Just War principle of discrimination, and so long as he responds to the threat posed by legitimate targets in kind he is abiding by the principle of proportionality.

Bushido goes even further, as there is no prohibition against the samurai attacking any sort of target so long as he is ordered to. The virtues of obedience to one's superiors and patient endurance even

unto death were exaggerated in Bushido over time, overshadowing all considerations of truly merciful behaviour and certainly any option for the Bushido adherent to choose his own targets. If a samurai truly felt that his orders were illegitimate he was required to resort to suicide before disobedience (Blomberg, 1994, p. 74). This then is the empty heart of Bushido in Levinasian terms, a positive turning away from the demand of proximity.

A telling modern example of Bushido's situating of the good in the dutiful carrying-out of necessary evils is recounted in the diary of an unknown Japanese soldier captured during World War II. The entry, dated March 29th 1943 and headed 'Blood Carnival', describes the execution of an Australian airman. After the man is cleanly beheaded, the author writes:

All is over. The head is white like a doll's. The savageness which I felt only a little while ago is gone, and now I feel nothing but the true compassion of Japanese Bushido (Anonymous cited in Russell, 1958, p. 81).

The ethical moment for the Japanese soldiers takes place not when deciding whether to end the prisoner's life (that is not their decision), but when deciding how they are going to end it. The compassion of Bushido is a stunted compassion, always limited by the impossibility of the samurai's refusal to do violence. This limitation, though extreme in Bushido, is a necessary part of all military codes of service. A soldier just is someone who has agreed to obey commands to harm others.

It will be useful at this point to make clear just what a totalitarianism and a totalitarian state is for Levinas. As has been shown, the other's ethical demand that inspires being is almost inextricably followed by a partial return of the subject to its own totality, the drifting insomniac state of sameness when the revelation of the Other is not taking place. Totality for Levinas can be compared perhaps with a form of idealism or solipsism, a way of experiencing the world wherein the self is not encountering the Other and thus feels as if all objects are more or less part of the self,

nourishing the self. He characterizes this attitude or tendency as a totalitarianism of the same. It is the limits placed by the same on the responsibility to the other (Morgan, 2007, p. 22). Since the primary ethical demand is irresistible and illimitable, Levinas must explain how the totalitarianism of the same is able to limit the response to alterity.

Levinas' explanation for how this is possible shows the relationship between the primary ethical demand and worldly beings and institutions. The initial revelation of the Other in proximity is indeed an infinite demand that cannot be limited, but after substitution has taken place and the self has returned to itself newly created by the encounter with alterity, we have entered the ontic realm. Beings abound, and the self and the face in which the pre-subjective self experienced proximity is now hepated as another human being. As soon as we have entered the ontic realm there is no longer only the responsibility for the other generating the self – there are objects and other others. This is the realm of consciousness and the third party, for “the act of consciousness is motivated by the presence of a third party alongside of the neighbour who approached. A third party is also approached . . . There must be a justice among incomparable ones (Levinas, 2008, p.16).”

We as beings are thus consciously aware only of this realm that includes the third party, and it is not surprisingly in this realm that interactions between the self and others take place. Proximity is not strictly an interaction – the self that was constituted by the ethical demand is infinitely passive. It is not an autonomous self interacting with another but heteronomous, shaped and dominated completely by the other's authority.

It is within this context of the third party that politics, economics and all the other structures used by human beings to regulate their relationships emerge. Once there are other others to consider (and there are always other others once there is a self), the self must resort to judgement to decide how to prioritise the other's demands. That is why Levinas somewhat vaguely refers to all systems and

institutions that regulate human relationships as systems of justice – we must choose, or judge, between all of the others.

We can now see that the primary ethical demand results in the creation of institutions and systems of judgement, which Levinas sometimes terms *arches*, but that the demand itself is an-archic. Since the other's demand realized in the realm of the third inspires and requires the very notion of justice, it naturally is not disconnected from them. In a 1982 interview Levinas differentiates between *arches* that have a tendency toward openness to alterity, and those that have a tendency toward delimitation, idealism and totalisation. It is these latter that Levinas terms totalitarianisms.

...it is in terms of the relation to the Face or of me before the other that we can speak of the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the state. A state in which the interpersonal relationship is impossible, in which it is generated in advance by the determinism proper to the state, is a totalitarian state (Levinas, 1982, cited in Morgan, 2007, p. 22)

The practical effect of a tendency toward totalisation in a political system can only be a failure to experience others in their capacity as unique beings, which is a deliberate closing off to the demand of proximity. Since the command of the other can be represented as “Thou Shalt Not Kill,” it is not dishonest to rephrase it as a demand for mercy and compassion. Every time we spontaneously show compassion to another who needs it we are acting on the demand of alterity in spite of our totality; we are responding to the other genuinely in terms of the face-to-face relationship of proximity. Some political systems, particularly nationalisms such as the third Reich, prohibit acts of kindness and compassion towards people who have been characterized by the *arche* as undeserving of such treatment. To constitute an individual without recognizing their alterity in this way is to totalise them – to constitute them as a non-human being within one's totality rather than as human being with which one can have a face-to-face encounter. This is a deliberate violation of the primordial ethical command of the other.

To continue with our example, the Empire of Japan was clearly a totalitarian state in Levinasian terms, claiming as it did the divinity of the Emperor and the unique destiny of the Japanese people.

A Levinasian reader would instantly recognize certain elements: The instinctive association of alterity with divinity within the human, and the totalitarian tendency to deny this alterity, and with it humanity, to those outside the *arche*. Bushido within this state was an even narrower totalitarianism. Once again 'Blood Carnival' provides us with a telling example, this time of a totalitarian suppression of response-ability, in the moment just before the Australian prisoner is beheaded:

When I put myself in the prisoner's place and thrill that in one more minute it will be good-bye to this world, although the daily (allied) bombings have filled me with hate, ordinary human feelings make me pity him (Anonymous cited in Russell, 1958, p. 80, parentheses mine).

The author has, in Levinasian terms, felt the ethical demand for mercy and suppressed it.

It has been mentioned that the demand of the other shows the heteronomous nature of the self, at least at its formation. It is worthwhile differentiating between Levinasian heteronomy in this sense and the word as it is more usually understood, as some military ethics, Bushido included, have made claims to being heteronomous. The two concepts however are not analogous.

In a traditional (i.e. non-Levinasian) sense, heteronomy means a subject whose will has been subverted to another's. The pre-war Japanese philosopher Watsuji Tetsuro referred to Bushido as an "ethic of devotion" and "absolute subordination" in the sense that the correctly acting samurai is a tool of his superior to do with as they wish (Ikagami, 1995, p. 85). Watsuji's phenomenology is too complex to be gone into here in detail, but it does shed interesting light on a modern philosophical understanding of the traditional Japanese ethics from which Bushido emerged. In *Rinrigaku: Ethics in Japan* he argues that the individual is constituted by acts of rebellion against a socio-ethical whole such as a state or a family (Watsuji, 1996, p. 120). He goes on to say however that it is the reclamation of the individual into the socio-ethical whole by acceding to its commands that is the ethical basis for all phenomena (Watsuji, 1996, p. 124).

Watsuji's philosophy was heavily criticized after the war, and it is easy to see that while it shared with Levinas's some features (i.e. the privileging of ethics over ontology), its characterization of the human encounter of alterity as an encounter with a socio-ethical group is fundamentally opposed to Levinas's characterization of it as an encounter with an individual face. Watsujian ethics proposes that humans are heteronomous in relation to their social groups, what Levinas would call *arches*. He identifies *arches* as the other in phenomenal form.

Levinas on the other hand understands heteronomy as the inability to resist the demand of the other during the face-to-face moment. We are constituted as selves by proximity with the other, and for Levinas being's Other is always revealed in the face of an individual. It is a one on one encounter, an *an-archic* cry for mercy, and for Levinas ethical behaviour is responding sincerely to this cry. For Watsuji ethical behaviour is subsuming oneself into an *archic* whole and ceasing rebellion. Watsuji's understanding of heteronomy is quite close to that of a traditional military ethic. The traditional soldier's defence of "I was only following orders" appeals to a Watsujian understanding of heteronomy.

The obvious problem that is faced by military ethics of service is that of reconciling the good with killing. John Protevi notes that in order to convince a human being to kill another certain conditions need to met, such as the cultivation of a state of extreme rage or hatred, or the overcoming of instinctive hesitation by conditioning reflex (Protevi, 2008, p. 408). The fact that these techniques are necessary for the majority of human beings to be able to attack and kill another points to a certain resonance with Levinas' idea that our very existence as human beings is infused with an ethical command to be merciful.

These techniques themselves can be seen in a Levinasian sense as tools for totalisation – the creation of a state of rage or the conditioning of reflex reduces an individual's response-ability (their

ability to respond genuinely to alterity). The indoctrination of the idea of the enemy as evil or unjust is a clear technique of totalitarianism as understood by Levinas.

If we return to our earlier definition of a warrior or soldier as one who has agreed to obey commands to harm others, it is difficult to see how this is not an example of totalitarianism in a Levinasian sense. The warrior agrees to subject him or herself to techniques of totalitarianism such as those discussed by Protevi at the hands of some *arche*.

Since it appears as though all military ethics and organizations as traditionally understood have totalitarian tendencies (at the very least) in Levinasian terms, it will be useful to discuss the possibility of violence in Levinas's thought in order to approach the question of a Levinasian military ethic.

We have seen how the entrance of a third party necessitates justice, but for Levinas the emergence of justice is also the emergence of violence. Once we realize that there are others, that we are an other to others, and that each other places an infinite demand on the self and the other others, we must allocate our finite resources to the tasks at hand. This results in a violence to all others, an inherent failure to respond adequately to anyone, even ourselves. Levinas calls this allocation of resources justice, and justice is inherently violent, as he mentions in a 1982 interview:

“There is a certain measure of violence necessary in terms of justice, but if one speaks of justice, it is necessary to allow judges, it is necessary to allow institutions and the state (Levinas, 1982, cited in Morgan, 2007, p. 22).”

Here Levinas is suggesting that being necessitates violence, and is also asserting that justice and ethics cannot be separated – it is inconceivable for being(s) to exist without justice, *arches*, or the

state.

This violence inherent in being is not to be confused with violence in the ordinary sense of the word. The ordinary violence practised by warriors is, in Levinasian terms, a failure to respond to alterity beyond the violence inherent in the idea of justice. It is an attack on an other. As Levinas says, "Violence can only aim at the Face (Levinas cited in Derrida, 1978, p. 147)."

Ordinary violence is not necessarily always unethical though. Since the emergence of the third (who is always with us) we are able to understand that all others, and ourselves, deserve justice. There is no reason Levinas would oppose the idea of defending oneself from an attack, as to allocate one's resources to protect an other (or oneself) from an attack is to attempt to protect another (or oneself) from being fatally totalised. This is a spontaneous act of compassion, an interruption of totalitarianism.

Even so, the totalitarian agent attacking another never forfeits his or her right to compassion or mercy. They cannot, as being's Other inspires all others and cannot be denied. This omnipresence of alterity does not mean however that the totalitarian other's wishes should be respected and that they should be allowed to freely kill you or your neighbour – this implies that the totalitarian other's wish to destroy others comes from their alterity, which it does not. It comes from the *arche* on whose behalf they act, the state that has subsumed the neighbour into a totalitarianism of the same. Only if the totalitarian other surrenders the fight and lays down their arms are they making a demand to which a genuine Levinasian ethical response is appropriate.

In this way it can be seen that attributing pacifism to Levinas is an error. There is not sufficient space to explore the idea in this essay, but it seems that it may be possible to conceive of a just war consistent with Levinasian ethics. The fact that Levinas during his life did not denounce Israel's

wars suggests that he believed just war was a possibility.

It seems that Levinasian ethics would essentially require of a soldier that he or she only act to defend others who are under threat from a totalitarianism, and that above all he or she be merciful. Mercy is precisely what most ethics of service implicitly restrict. Bushido deliberately bans mercy for the one identified as the enemy.

It is open for debate whether or not all of us are required to act in defence of our neighbour, though presumably Levinasian ethics could not require us to lay down our lives for others. A soldier on the other hand is in a unique position ethically as they can and in fact are required to actually sacrifice themselves for others in a way beyond what is normally expected. There is an interesting resonance between some of Levinas' writing and current Just War theory. In *Killing in War*, Jeff MacMahan writes: "Just combatants who wear uniforms are analogous to a person who volunteers to be a substitute hostage for terrorists (MacMahan 2009, p. 56)."

Compare this passage from *Otherwise than Being*, one of many that equates the subject with a hostage: "For under accusation by everyone, the responsibility for everyone goes to the point of substitution. A subject is a hostage (Levinas 2008, p. 112)."

While these two uses of the word "hostage" are probably not intended to be understood in the same way, Levinas's claim that all subjects are hostages means that the possibility of his understanding a soldier as a hostage in a less abstract sense is not so easily dismissible, especially in light of passages such as this:

"I approach the infinite insofar as I forget myself for my neighbour who looks at me. I forget myself only in breaking the undephasable simultaneity of representation, in existing beyond my death. I approach the infinite by sacrificing myself. . . and the truth of transcendence consists of the concurring of speech with acts (Levinas cited in ANU, 2009, p. 181)

It seems as though Levinas is saying that proof of the transcendental passage of substitution in the phenomenal world consists of giving one's life for another. It could be claimed then that we could re-construct our previous definition of a warrior as "one who agrees to harm others" in a more Levinasian light using this trope. Perhaps if a warrior is conceived as being one who agrees to be harmed for others, in place of others, we have a more palatable definition in a Levinasian sense, even though the way "hostage" is used above implies no agreement: Strictly speaking for Levinas, all subjects must be hostages.

Another interesting resonance with this idea is to be found in an etymological analysis of the Japanese word *bushi*, a component of Bushido normally translated as "warrior". The translator William Scott Wilson notes about the written word *bushi*:

"Breaking down the character *bu* reveals the radical meaning (to) "stop", and an abbreviation of the radical "spear". The *Shuo Wen*, an early Chinese dictionary, gives this definition: "*Bu* consists of subduing the weapon and therefore stopping the spear."

The second character in *bushi*, *shi*, originally meant something like "scholar" but quickly came to mean the upper class (Wilson, 1987, p. 16)." This etymology shows that early Japanese people thought of the *bushi*, the precursor of the samurai¹, as a learned judge whose role was to prevent violence or maintain order.

A Levinasian soldier would perhaps be one who, when their neighbour is being wronged, accomplishes the role of hostage by offering his or her own body in place of their neighbour's. They stand between the violence of totalitarianism and innocent others, stopping the spear with their own bodies. Since pacifism in the face of totalitarianism seems dubious according to Levinas, it seems permissible for a warrior to act in this way. Therefore a Levinasian warrior could perhaps

¹ According to the Online Etymology Dictionary (www.etymonline.com), the term samurai is derived from the Japanese verb *sabura(h)u*, "to be in attendance, to serve", and so means something like "one who waits to receive orders."

be defined as someone who agrees to take the place of an other who is under attack. It just so happens that they are better equipped to defend themselves than the original target was!

This in no way implies an organized military, as such a thing would definitely be regarded as distinctly un-Levinasian. If any practical ethics can be extracted from Levinas' phenomenology it would be a situational ethics (Morgan 2007, p. 243), and the idea of two opposed armies of warriors acting on behalf of *arches* and targeting each other as legitimate stand-ins for civilians presumes that both *arches* are acting in self-defence, which is patently absurd. Probably the closest thing to an organized military that could be permissible assuming a Levinasian basis is something like a police force acting on behalf of an ethical state.

With this in mind, it may be useful to characterize what an ethical state might look like in Levinasian terms. In *Levinas and the Political* Caygill discusses Levinas' 1976 lecture 'The Ethical Relationship as a departure from Ontology', wherein Levinas proposes that a state that always maintains a space for genuine responses to the demands of the other is a state limited by responsibility rather than violence, and that such a state has the advantage that "one can revolt against institutions in the name of that which gave birth to them (Levinas cited in Caygill, 2002, p. 129)." That is, a compassionate state is one that has a tendency toward responding to the individual's alterity rather than subjecting it to totalisation.

This exploration has led us to two conclusions. Firstly, in Levinasian terms traditional military ethics of service, exemplified in our discussion by Japanese Bushido, are profoundly unethical in that their purpose is to blunt response-ability and prevent warriors from performing spontaneous acts of compassion. They are almost pure examples of totalitarian thinking and are unable to be reconciled with Levinasian ethics.

Secondly, an ethic of service compatible with Levinas's philosophy is certainly not inconceivable. The placing of oneself in danger in lieu of another is in a way an affirmation and re-enactment of the ethical moment that creates the subject. Such an ethic of service would perhaps bear much more resemblance to that of a police force than a standing military, the very concept of which seems deeply problematic if we are to adopt Levinas's position. Such a Levinasian soldier would need to be merciful, wise and non-aggressive, though not a pacifist. They would be akin to a *bushi* in the etymological sense, "one who stops the spear," rather than merely a samurai, "one who awaits orders".

Australian National University

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Blomberg, C., 1994. *The Heart of the Warrior: Origins and Religious Background of the Samurai System in Feudal Japan*. Surrey: Curzon Press.

Caygill, H., 2002. *Levinas and the Political*. London and New York: Routledge.

Derrida, J., 1978. 'Violence and Metaphysics' in *Writing and Difference*. Translated by Alan Bass. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Ikagami, E., 1995. *The Taming of the Samurai, Honorific Individualism and the Making of Modern Japan*. USA: Harvard University Press.

Levinas, E., 2009. Enigma and Phenomenon, in *Thou Shall Not Kill, an Exploration of the Ethics and Politics of Emmanuel Levinas, PHIL3073 readings*. Canberra: Australian National

University.

Levinas, E., 2008. *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence*. Translated by Alphonso Lingis. Pennsylvania: Duquesne University Press.

Lord Russell of Liverpool, 1958. *The Knights of Bushido, a Short History of Japanese War Crimes*. London: Cassell.

MacMahan, J., 2009. *Killing in War*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Morgan, M., 2007. *Discovering Levinas*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Protevi, J., 2008. 'Affect, Agency and Responsibility: The Act of Killing in the Age of Cyborgs' in *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences*. 7.3, pg. 405-413.

Watsuji, T., 1996. *Rinrigaku, Ethics in Japan*. Translated by Yamamoto Seisaku and Robert E. Carter. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Wilson, W.S., 1987. *Ideals of the Samurai, Writings of Japanese Warriors*. California, Ohara Publications.