

DASEIN'S STRUGGLE WITH 'OTHERS'

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Human Freedom no longer means freedom as a property of man [sic] but as a possibility of freedom

(Heidegger, 2002/orig1924, p. 93)

Dasein's struggle is an investigation of the writings of Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) to consider whether his thoughts and beliefs would be useful and / or insightful in addressing contemporary society and its discriminatory practices towards disabled people. Heidegger's basic existential being *Dasein*, is in constant interaction and interconnection with *others* as it negotiates its best possibilities of *Being-in-the-world*. This pursuit of an 'authentic' existence is interpreted as a struggle for individuality, acceptance, engagement and resistance to social conformity and anonymity. Developing the analysis through the theme of 'Being' (*Being and Time*, 1927) the paper's discussion is centred on Critical Disability Studies and the evolving Studies in Ableism. The interpretation is underpinned by the contemporary voice of disability, predominantly by autobiographical insights of Nancy Mairs' (1996) *Waist-high in the world; A life among the nondisabled*, together with other autobiographical, biographical and narrative texts. The paper presents an alternative perspective in the "endeavour to know" using Heidegger's philosophy to think differently about the experience of disability.

History has witnessed discriminatory practices faced by disabled people and played host to the far-reaching methodologies of non-recognition and socio-economic marginalization that led to the establishment of cultural norms, deprivation, exploitation and social expectations. The legacy of such policies, focused on the allocation of resources, on materiality and the distribution of social position, was the objectification and ritualistic, systemic injustice of not only disabled people but also all marginalized groups. However Heidegger argues that human history or existence was not grounded in objectifying fact or the status of the individual, but rather in the identity of pervious significance within the world of 'Being.' Unlike more traditional understandings of humankind which focussed on the detached reflection of generalized, accepted theories or practicalities, in *Being & Time* (1927), Heidegger attempts to reveal the characteristics or processes of humankind (*Dasein*) through

universal existential structures that informed everyday existence. *Dasein*, is obliged to strive towards authenticity through the assumption of social practice, roles and norms which were presupposed in one's *Being-with-others* (*Mitsein*). Yet within the basic constitution of human existence, *Care* (*Sorge*), Heidegger reveals a negative, defective¹ sense of *Being-with-others* (*das Man*), a concern for the present which alienated *Dasein* from authenticity. This 'attitude' and behaviour offered the means to divert conscience and facilitated absorption into the 'crowd mentality' through its apparent predisposition to accept, without question or debate, the injustice handed down to marginalized groups.

This paper explains the nature of *Dasein's* 'Being' and its struggle towards authenticity will uncover its interrelatedness within the world through the existential structures of *Care*. By considering each of the three structures, facticity (*Faktizitat*), possibility (*Moglichkeit*) and fallenness (*Verfallen*), I expose the discriminatory disposition of *das Man*; *indifference* for Heidegger's work provides a platform for a symptomatic interpretation of contemporary interaction with disabled people. I also detail individual discussions of the three factors of fallenness; everybody, anybody and publicness. These afford *Dasein* the means of involvement in inauthentic behaviour and detachment from *difference* and result in its own diminution and that of the wider social conscience.

In its formal and informal, implied and expressed, overt and covert customs and mannerisms, society has worked to divide the human community and oppress many of its members. Laws have prohibited discrimination and public expression of such

¹ Heidegger's (1962 / orig 1927) use of 'defective' relates to the common failure or shortcoming of humankind to ignore the pursuit of authenticity and bears absolutely no correlation to contemporary terminology relating to the characterization of disabled people.

sentiment has been labelled uncharitable, unsympathetic and unsophisticated. Yet the underlying ethos has not disappeared from official policies and practices, but has remained an active, insidious force with endless manifestations (Linton, 1998). Indeed, Young (1990) argued the “objectification and overt domination of despised bodies, created in the Nineteenth Century, had receded only to be replaced by discursive commitment to equality” (p.124). Mairs (1997) insisted western discourse was not equipped to conceive “that which is neither ‘I’ nor ‘not-I’; [for] the ‘not-I’ is, by definition, other. And we’ve never been too fond of the other. We prefer the same” (p.53-54). Racism, sexism, ageism and even ableism have simply gone underground, dwelling in everyday habits and cultural meanings. Common activity, cultural interpretation, social policies and practices have all served to control and marginalize disabled people and unfortunately such barriers have been integrated to the point of invisibility (Linton, 1998). However society must not absolve itself from the responsibility of individual and collective justice by assuming such behaviour and standards were beyond adjustment, beyond change. For life is the accumulation of the complex whole, consisting of individual and societal experiences which all have bearing on the ‘Being’ of ‘others’ in the common world (Audi, 1999; Kenkmann, 2005; Tuttle, 2005).

Authenticity

Heidegger, (1962/orig.1927) maintains that Cartesian understanding of humanity is inadequate for it merely represents a state of aliveness (*nur nochleben*) and therefore not the answer to the question of ‘Being’² (Aho, 2007; Elkholy, 2008). Mairs (1997) concurred;

² The ontological difference of ‘being’ as distinct from being human. (Lewis, 2005)

... [The adjustments to Multiple Sclerosis] had rammed my 'self' straight back into the body I had been trained to believe...I could rise above. The western tradition of distinguishing the body from the mind and / or the soul is so ancient as to have become part of our collective unconscious.... an unquestioned element of social instruction imposed...from birth. I *have* a body, you don't say I *am* a body...[for] the I and the body aren't ...indistinguishable (p.53)

Heidegger's (1962/orig.1927) *historicity* then, describes the happening of life as a stretching (*Strecke*) between the past and future; as between birth and death; the process from inauthentic towards authentic (Audi, 1999) "for life was time itself" (Tuttle, 2005, p.69). Not simply supportive as an external dimension of historical reality, life is the context of time through which *Dasein* experienced, acted, thought and sought truth (Cavalier, 1998; Tuttle, 2005). Constantly advancing towards a subsequent present, *Dasein's existenz* is not that of natural science and the public world but the very nature of its own subsistence "for *Dasein* is disclosed to itself authentically or it may exist inauthentically with regard to its existence" (Heidegger, 1962 /orig.1927, p.372).

Dasein then, lives with others, in a concrete, historically determinant situation as a 'subject' in the world and not the object of sophisticated, theoretical conceptions such as substance, cause or inequality (Haugeland, 1982). Tuttle (2005) defined *Dasein's* 'lived experience' as a function of authentic time as "the forward, irreversible and indivisible succession of conscious states of meaningful relation" (p.51) through emergence from a past into the reality of a present and the anticipation of a future. Life was the making and responsibility of 'choices' and possibilities that belonged to our shared history but mostly "forgotten, covered by conformist assumptions and prejudices of contemporary life" (Aho, 2007, p.220). Indeed, *Dasein* routinely 'chooses' to avoid / forget this fact, loosing itself in the present, in things at hand and the 'happening' of a mass society filled with expectations as anonymous, spectators

for the 'now' rather than the future possibilities are its primary concern (Cavalier, 1998; Tuttle, 1996; 2005).

Such acceptance and identity of standardized mass society is secured through the systematic social exclusion and marginalization, identified in terms of "normal and the pathological and mechanisms of ordering" (Campbell, 2009, p.6). Unfortunately, disabled individuals have been routinely excluded from the wider community for they have never been considered normal within the dominant cultural discourse (Thomson, 1997). In his discussion into the social constrictions and restrictions placed on his life, Longmore (2003) suggested that,

...It seems to me that some of us are going to have to talk frankly about what it is really like for us disabled people if we ever hope to break down the barriers of prejudice and discrimination that 'cripple' our lives (p231)

While disability is historically identified as a personal attribute, Heidegger (1962/orig.1927) argues there is no *pre-given human essence* but simply self-interpreting beings in the course of the happening of their active lives, capable of taking a stand over their shared socio-historical existence (*Geschehen*) in a world where beings emerge through the development of authentic identity (Aho, 2007; Audi, 1999).

The 'Fundamental' Structures of Dasein

The revelations and roles of *Being and Time* have been uncovered through Heidegger's (1962/orig.1927) notion of *Care* and its characteristic structures of human life. Considered the centre of our 'Being,' rather than soul, reason or individuality, these transcendental structures (facticity, possibility and fallenness) allow for the understanding of the uniqueness of human reality; of *Dasein's existenz*

(Cavalier, 1998) and are correlated with the basic *ecstases* (dimensions of time; past/future/present) to reveal *Dasein's* existence as a whole.

Heidegger's first structure, *Facticity*, (thrownness) embodies all the elements of existence, which are given, not chosen, by *Dasein* (Tuttle, 2005; Ree, 1998). Thrown into a world not of its choosing, already delivered over to the task of living out its life in a concrete fashion, this structure is revealed in moods, notions of the body, one's finitude, history, past and general situation (Cavalier, 1998; Tuttle, 2005). It allows for the 'givenness' of humanity's past and demands acceptance of one's past as a function of the present and future. Indeed *facticity* is the site of inauthenticity, for it acknowledges the reflexive nature of *Dasein's* selfhood within the world and affords the possibility of an authentic form of '*being-with*' as the correlation of possibility (*Möglichkeit*) (future) (Lewis, 1005; Cavalier, 1998). Previous interpretations that correlated inauthentic '*being-with*' to the structure of *fallenness* limited *Dasein* to a being which focussed solely on the present, present at hand and actuality (Elkholy, 2008; Lewis, 2005). Yet in its *facticity*, *Dasein's* projection of possibilities is thrown back to the structures of the world; involved in the world, not simply through instrumentality, but submitting to the differential relations of significance and being anonymous in the symbolic order of the world (Lewis, 2005). Such anonymity has provided for the faltering *Dasein*, to take refuge in inauthentic representation in terms of things of nature or 'components' (Cavalier, 1998; Tuttle, 1996). However Heidegger (1962/orig.1927) insists that the routine surrender to the inauthentic is merely a form of protection against the reality of its need for authenticity (Cavalier, 1998). This remains ever-present through the call of *conscience* that revealed the

chronic raggedness, disunity and incompleteness of *Being-in-the world* (Ree, 1998; Taylor, 2003) as a function of mass pre-occupation with acceptance and uniformity.

Therefore, contrary to more traditional readings of Heidegger's philosophy, *Dasein's* absorbed state of 'everydayness' is not actually related to the dimension or "fault-line" (Lewis, 2005, p.21) of the inauthentic and authentic. It is the function of *indifference*; a divide which has *Dasein* recognizing its own absorption to varying degrees (*das Man*) (Cavalier, 1998) and its resultant varying acceptance of social discriminatory practices and oppression of *others*. *Dasein* is the 'process' of the differentiation of indifference, an individuation of humankind that remains incomplete; trapped between the authentic and inauthentic and constantly threatened by re-immersion in 'the indifferent' (Lewis, 2005; Cavalier, 1998). The critical distinction then, for this paper, is not the separation of the authentic and inauthentic state, but the separation of the '*absorbed*' state of *indifference* (existing as the independent realities of discrimination and marginalization of disabled individuals and other minorities) allowing for the growing invisibility of disabled individuals rather "than [acceptance] as an ordinary human being for whom [society] ha[s] some use" (Mairs, 1987, p.123). Equally significant though, the compound structure of authenticity / inauthenticity combined as opposing 'vectors' (Lewis, 2005) of the process of selfhood, expose how the limits of 'Being' regulate wider community activity, social conscience and interactions with disability.

The second structure *Possibility*, refers to the reality and anticipation of *Dasein's* future through definite decisions made in relation to dreams and expectations (Tuttle, 1996, 2005). Human existence was always 'ahead of itself' through competent

dealings with the familiar, which sketched out future possibilities and actions that shaped lives (Cavalier, 1998). Indeed, Heidegger (1962 /orig 1927) maintains that ongoing fulfilment of possibilities through life contributed to *Dasein's* identity and all decisions made (understandings), defined the totality of its *existenz* (Audi, 1999; Cavalier, 1998). Paul Longmore (2003) graphically articulates the position of the disabled individual when he wrote,

...We are instructed that if we adopt an indomitable spirit and a cheerful attitude, we can transcend our disability and fulfil our dreams. The truth is that the major obstacles we must overcome are pervasive social prejudice, systematic segregation and institutional discrimination.... Social service phobias, in particular have forced millions of us to the margins of society (p. 231).

Mairs (1996) adds,

...Even the human infant is hardwired to utter the phrase "I can do it myself... so insistent is the drive toward self-care...The difference is that whereas such emotion stimulated the [infant's] progress, it merely tears me apart, since I will never again grow drunk on the worldview from atop two moving legs...But the craving for personal independence remains alive and well (pp.68-69)

...For regardless when their disabled lives began, [we] are all confronted with the same issues in the cooperative human endeavour known as life...people seem surprised often patronizing when they find out I have a job and a social a life...[there is continuing] outright bias...and discrimination [in areas of employment, life and welfare] (pp.135-37)

thereby making the dreams of disabled individuals inaccessible and unappreciated by the indifferent, wider community.

Finally, *Fallenness*, while concerned with the present, alienates *Dasein* from the actuality of its own World (Cavalier, 1998; Tuttle, 1996). Addressing identity in terms of the 'everyday' nature of *Dasein*, Heidegger (1962/orig 1927) insists that the notion of '*I-myself*' is not one of individuality but rather existence as a public or social entity (Tuttle, 1996; 2005). As a *Being-in-the-world*, *Dasein* understands *Being-with-others* through social commonality, an existential '*Being-with*' (Gorner, 2007; Tuttle, 1996). So '*Being-with*' presents a public dimension suggesting that everyday *Dasein* lives in a manner basically indistinguishable from 'anybody' as a

sociality within the World (Ree, 1998). This world of common language, practice and manipulation offers understanding through social norms and *Dasein* an existence, by reference and appropriation of *das Man* (Cavalier, 1998; Gorner, 2007; Tuttle, 1996, 2005). Indeed *Being-with* requires a common competence to be *with-others*, an understanding in solicitude (*Fürsorge*) and the deductive capacity to create harmony for *Being-with-others* allows for the 'own-most' possibility of the self (Tuttle, 1996) and implies that *Being-in-the-world* was the normal way for dealing with others.

Nevertheless, it has been endlessly demonstrated that society is far more comfortable having the identity of the disabled individual remain a function of indifference; of social discrimination and intolerance rather than the understanding and acceptance of unique 'possibilities' of human existence. Mairs (1996) suggests that a "cripple [sic] in order to earn a shot at social intercourse with normals, must never publicly lament her state, must preferably never mention it" (p7) as the reality of disability remains a problematic, 'uncomfortable' reality for 'normals' and allows for varying degrees of ambivalence, disregard and rejection. As Mairs (1996) concludes "those of us who require care constitute an intolerable burden on society...we have nothing to offer to the human project...I am reduced to a vortex, sucking in the recourses around me without replenishing them in kind" (p.76) for the undifferentiated has judged her reality, her essence, her truth to be a burden, therefore required segregation and absorption within the welfare state.

'Truth'

Heidegger (1962/orig 1927) maintains that the *essence of truth* is not composed of judgement nor proposition, but the 'making unhidden' (*Aletheia*), the revealing or showing of reality through the nature of *Dasein* itself (Tuttle, 2005). This essential

characteristic belongs to the primordial nature of humankind yet *Dasein* is often closed to such discovery through the state of *fallenness*. Knowledge is the result of *Dasein's* openness to the pre-condition of truth and therefore existence is, in part, the capacity to uncover and understand actuality (Tuttle, 2005). However Heidegger (1962/orig 1927) is not suggesting that truth only related to / was the measure of *Dasein* but rather its 'openness to truth' allowed revelation. This openness if it is a pre-condition of truth, this judgement about the world presupposes the capacity grounded in humankind's receptivity, to true disclosure and knowledge (Cavalier, 1998; Tuttle, 1996; 2005) then the future for disabled people remains marginal as *das Man* seems in no hurry to reveal and /or address the truth of their *existenz*.

The Everydayness of Social Discrimination

Our *being-in-the-world* is never to be understood in the singular, private 'who' of an 'I-myself' over and against 'others' (Kenkmann, 2005; Tuttle, 1996). Heidegger (1962/orig 1927) argues that the unique self, the individuated ego of *Dasein*, the isolated encapsulated subject, is not the foundational notion of society (Cavalier, 1998; Tuttle, 2005; 1996). Rather *Being-with (Mitsein)* insists that 'Being' is a priori in the world with others, for it possesses a public dimension that is both intersubjective and constitutive of *Dasein's* 'Being.' Indeed, *being-with* is of positive significance to *Dasein* for it necessitates a commonality of possibilities, proper to oneself and others (Lewis, 2005). Heidegger's (1962/orig.1927) definition of humanity, which has not entered the authentic state of *Dasein*, remains undifferentiated in the "guise of *das Man*" (Lewis, 2005. p.25) and immersed in the differentiated relations of the symbolic order;³ the system of significations known as

³ Constituted by 'routes' existing between the use and end result of things produced

the world (Lewis, 2005; Ree, 1998; Tuttle, 2005). The problem is individuality within the stifling commonality of the symbolic order, *Dasein* is not the exception but the 'process' of world-formulation, the discursivization of meaning to signification, the fall of 'Being' to beings and the gestures through which intelligibility becomes conceptualized and rooted in 'historicality' of the present (Cavalier, 1998; Lewis, 2005).

Indeed, Heidegger (1962/orig 1927) argues *Ge-rede*⁴ (idle talk) is the 'expression' and language of undifferentiated *das Man*, the referential context of significance; it is the articulation (*Artikulant*) of 'Being' which prevents growth towards singularity (selfhood) by allowing for obscurity through possibilities afforded in commonality (Lewis, 2005; Ree, 1998)(An example is the socially accepted notion of 'citizenship' as an exclusive 'status' rather than an inclusive 'practice'). Such average understanding of discourse, "the groundlessness of idle talk is no obstacle to it becoming public; instead it encourages it" (Heidegger, 1962 / orig 1927, p.213) "for we are already listening only to what is said in-the-talk as such. What is said-in-the-talk is understood; but what the talk is about is only understood approximately and superficially" (Heidegger, 1962 / orig 1927, p.212) and offers the chance for "understanding [of] everything without previously making the thing one's own" (Heidegger, 1962 / orig 1927, p.213).

...Many of the more personal accounts...concentrate so fully on ... the singularities of disabled life that they fail to reflect the ways in which such life is indistinguishable from any other sort; fuelled by the same appetites, fraught with the same anxieties, replete with the same delights. My hope is that, in scrutinizing some of these elements common to the human condition...the need for both independence and nurturance, the ceaseless search for equality and justice and pleasure...through the lens of my own experiences...I can bring to life their particular significance (Mairs, 1996, p.11-12).

⁴ The translation to English is confusing. Is meant to imply such jointure was unnecessary / irrelevant to proper/ authentic *Dasein*

The idle talk of *das Man* as a function of ignorance and intolerance has deprived itself of a world filled with the richness of difference. To allow the 'silence' of *others* to speak challenges the status quo of the ableist society. As Mairs (1996) discusses, the narrowness of commonality, the prejudice and stigma placed upon what is not understood through fear and obsession to be normal, has diminished society for its *being-with-others* remains wholly inauthentic. Indeed *das Man* has lost sight of the fact that any "jointure of possibilities" (Lewis, 2005, p.24) is not part of an objective whole but inherently involved with singularity of one's individual death for *das Man* would not die (*es nicht sterben Kann*) (c.f.Heidegger, 1962/orig.1927.§477) as the subject-position one occupied. The symbolic order outlives any one individual, sealing its identification as *indifferent* and absorbed wholly within the world as the object of thrown projection (c.f.Heidegger1962/orig.1927.§284) (Cavalier, 1998; Lewis, 2005; Tuttle, 2005).

Since the world is articulated in common possibilities *Dasein's* position is established through comparison and substitution, the calculated difference between oneself and 'others' in common terms (Elkholy, 2008). Such *distantiality* (*Abständigkeit*) confines *Dasein* to a differentiated system where signifiers construct ability and purpose of individuality through comparison to 'others' and making constant, the care of how one differed (c.f.Heidegger, 1962/orig.1927.§126) through quantitative rather than qualitative measurements (Lewis, 2005; Tuttle, 1996). This is evidenced, as disability remains referential to the able-bodied in contemporary society. Moreover, *distantiality* encourages the 'thrown' limitation of *Dasein's* possibilities through confinement to the symbolic order in which it was born, for the subject-positions, within the world, were indeed indifferent to their occupants so *das Man* is

undifferentiated in the aspirations of making such possibilities exclusive for its 'Being' (Lewis, 2005).

Considering only forms of difference between various subject-positions, restricts *Dasein* to indifferent articulation of intelligibility or reinforced subjection to *das Man's* articulations of 'others' (through *Ge-rede*) for no possibility is treated specifically but defined through its indifference to individuality (Elkholy, 2008; Lewis, 2005). Such restriction of other 'possibilities' through this *being-with* of interchangeability, limited possibilities to those who could share and increased the inconspicuous domination (c.f. Heidegger, 1962/orig.1927.§126) of *das Man*⁵ to inhabit only those possibilities which were common (Elkholy, 2008; Lewis, 2005; Tuttle, 2005). Indeed *Dasein* as everyday *being-with-one-another* has stood in subjection (*Botmässigkeit*) to *others* (Lewis, 2005); "it, itself is not; its being has been taken away by the other... for one belongs to the others oneself and enhances their power (Heidegger, 1962 / orig 1927, p.127).

Thus the enduring nature of social norms has provided a sense of immutability and legitimacy yet such standards have evolved, often arbitrarily, through fear, anxiety and the false assumption of those in power. As Heidegger (1962/orig 1927) argues, difference was not an individual characteristic but the result of social comparison from dominant sections of community (Goffman, 1997). Critical Disability Studies however offers new ways of conceptualising disability,

⁵ See Heidegger (1962) also described an inauthentic form of *Fürsorge* (Care) as "in such solicitude, the other can become one who was dominated and dependent even if this domination was a tactic one" §122

...As an anti-necessitarian understanding of disability that focussed on genuine inclusiveness [and possibilities] for it was never a question of health or medicine nor an issue of sensitivity or comparison but a question of politics and power[lessness], power over and power to... (Devlin & Pothier, 2006, p.6).

As Heidegger (1962/orig 1927) exposes the reality of indifference and danger of *Ge-rede* through philosophical abstraction, Critical Disability Studies offers concrete explanations and illustrations through the interrogation of language, definition and voice of disability (Devlin & Pothier, 2006). Society has positioned itself to believe that 'disability' is the central identity and self-definition of disabled person for it was the most noticeable; exaggerating the differences between 'us and them' (Smart, 2003).

No doubt using the term 'disability' has been convenient to the wider community and offered control for its general parlance signified a material, physical or psychological condition. While considered predominately through medical significance, it became the linchpin in the complex net of social ideals, institutions and policies. Conveying disabled individuals as the function of difference or variance through medicalization provided the need to cure / treat the condition rather than the social processes and political constrictions (Linton, 1998; Tremain, 2002). Regarded as a form of identity, it has increasingly allowed discrimination and oppression as the consequence of its 'conspicuous' categorization that has remained impossible to quantify or qualify. This 'minority group' has more recently been re-defined through the development of the social model of disability into a socio-political category, identified as *persons with a disability* and bound by common social and political experience.

...The phrase "people with differing abilities" however uselessly inexact, intuitively grasps life's messiness in a way the polarity "ability-disability" does not... "I" am disabled then, only from "your" point of view (and "you" from "mine") (Mairs, 1996, p.14).

Other terms such as *physically challenged*, the *able disabled* and *special people / children* have emerged over time and while possibly well meaning, serve only to increase the 'charitable mentality' as endemic paternalism salved the conscience of *das Man* (Linton, 1998). For indeed the disabled individual has been expected to make others comfortable with their disability, "for a grumpy cripple isn't playing by the rules"(Mairs, 1987, p.123). The unwritten law mandates it initiate conversation with regards condition, disclosure of aetiologic limitations and acceptance of its lot in life (Belgrave, 1984; Murphy, 1987). Language conveying passivity and victimization reinforces stereotypes of the supposed dependent, childlike, sensitive, miserable and less competent life of the disabled individual. Such "deterministic, essentialist perspectives have continued to flourish in the absence of contradictory information" (Linton, 1998, p.25) and political undermining of possibilities for self-determination (Linton, 1998).

Yet Critical Disability Studies has targeted the historical assumptions, definition and the 'categorization' of dominant discourse, the construction of rationality, agency of personhood and the hierarchical binary of mind and body (Devlin & Pothier, 2006). Such a binaristic approach with regards to disability highlights Heidegger's (1962 / orig 1927) articulation of 'others;' the indifference to individuality through the domination of *das Man*. Critical Disability Studies has argued that a more nuance reality would suggest disability might be better considered through a more dynamic and contextualized interpretation of an individual rather than the manufactured response and construction of society (Tyjewski, 2006).

Social convention however has established 'disability' as a *normative* experience (Augé & Herzlich, 1995) in that there were rules and expectations of disabled individuals. The elements of ableism demand a scaling or ordering to enforce the concept of difference (Campbell, 2009). Certain behaviours and attitudes are absolutely obligatory and rule breakers experience severe consequences. Those ignoring / not complying with the dictate of the 'common' have been subjected to the discriminatory practices, marginalization and categorization of invisible *others* (Chouinard, 1997). Ableist relations require the disabled body be diminished to "recalcitrant corporeal matter" (Mitchell, 2002, p.17) in order to maintain the essential 'male' features of assurance, control and autonomy (Campbell, 2009). Those who learn to comply with such convention through 'anonymity' are endured but remain within the "normative shadows" (Overboe, 2007).

Overboe (2007) insists that the 'naturalness' of the able-bodied individual and the negation of disabled expression of life requires disabled individuals to queue for the appointed 'person-first' status. Yet this achievement of "proving [oneself worthy... finding a way to compensate...for [one's] deviation from the norm (Mairs, 1987, p.123) merely legitimizes an able-bodied resemblance and validates the continuum of the disabled individual ranging from 'person first' to "pitiful gimps and cripples" [sic] (Overboe, 1999). Indeed the disabled individual has been abjectified (Kristeva, 1982) by Heidegger's (1962/orig 1927) *others*. Ableism's production of identity, system and order (Kristeva, 1982) in the construction of humankind through regulatory, normative practices produces the "less than human, the human and the humanly unthinkable" (Butler, 1993 p.8). Those considered unspeakable or illegible remain

sequestered, labelled as a 'bare life,' a mere existence, an "exception to the rule" (Agamben, 1998, p.8) and separated from those with language.

The 'overcoming of a disability' has been rewarded with labels of competence for "success came to mainstream adapters" (Zola, 1991, p.160). Their strength of mind and *sheer willpower* provide the means to challenge their disability and achieve success beyond societal expectations (Linton, 1998).

...Most nondisabled people, except perhaps the very old, have gotten the message that it isn't politically correct to look me up and down and burst out, "Oh you poor thing! I feel so sorry for you!" Instead, their response tends to take the form of unmerited admiration. "You're so brave!" They gush, generally when I have done nothing more awesome than to roll up to the dairy case and select a carton of vanilla yoghurt (Mairs, 1996, p.32).

Yet as Linton (1998) argues, *das Man* would generally ignore the 'reality' of such a disabled individual, as their social stigma was less potent. The rhetoric of 'overcoming' is simply a stipulation generated from the undifferentiated others, demanding resolute internal behaviour and performance rather than initiating social change. However I have no desire to continue the debate through the traditional discussion of disablism (assumptions and practices promoting differential treatment of disabled people) or assimilation into normative society through compensatory activities (Linton, 1998). This would inevitably reinforce distortions, omissions and gaps in the social construction of disability and the voice of Heidegger's *das Man*. Equally, ableism "problematizes the signifier disability and suggests that the essential core is the formation of a naturalised understanding [of humankind] (Campbell, 2009, p.6) based on enforced presumptions that erased difference (Chouinard, 1997).

Studies in Ableism has highlighted the management of disability through the mainstream ableist viewpoint which Heidegger (1962/orig 1927) argues was both

dangerous and unproductive as the undifferentiated being (*das Man*) was not striving for authenticity but lost in the indifferent assumptions of the crowd mentality. In fact it is diminished, in the fallen state (*Verfallen*); restricted by its need for commonality, of normative citizenship and is therefore hostage of the body (Foucault, 1977).

The Concept of Averageness in Society

Dasein's encounter with others through everyday engagement points to the other constituent of its 'Being'; its *Being-with-others* (*Mitsein*) (c.f.Heidegger 1962/orig.1927,§125). Indeed Heidegger's (1962/orig.1927) interpretation of *Dasein* is not an exclusive analysis of the self (subject) for integral to its 'Being' was the world and its *Being-with-others* (Cavalier, 1998; Kankmann, 2005; Ree, 1998). By *Being-in-the-world*, *Dasein*, whether aware or not, is already in relation to others (specifically disabled individuals for this paper) and this inherent, ontological constitution, of *Dasein-with* (*Mitda-sein*), maintains that *Dasein* has never understood itself in isolation but through relation to others and the world in which others exist alongside (c.f.Heidegger, 1962/orig.927.§118) (Elkholy, 2008). Therefore to know oneself was to know others. Grounded in the primordial understanding of *Being-with*, understanding of others was a function of self and the relation of 'Being' to others was a "projection of one's own being towards oneself 'into an other' for the other was a double of the self" (c.f.Heidegger, 1962/orig.1927.§124) (Elkholy, 2008, p.33). I would therefore contend that Heidegger's (1962/orig.1927) philosophical conceptualization of 'Being' and *being-with-others* provides a strong framework with which to consider the social construction of disability, for ironically, an intimate knowledge of self lies in the knowledge of the other. Further through Heidegger's (1962/orig.1927) analysis, labels of normalcy, the pursuit of the familiar and

destruction of difference and ranking of individuality become counterproductive to the humankind struggle for existence as the commonality of society requires acceptance and understanding in its everydayness.

Such 'commonality' or state of 'anybody' affords *Dasein* a social dimension, a 'normal' way of referring to and dealing with others. Yet *Dasein* has taken its possibilities, initially from an interpretation of the 'They' (society as an entity), which restricted options of choice to that which was considered as feasible, proper and familiar (Elkholy, 2008). Such decisions, according to Heidegger (1962/orig.1927), are motivated by a defence against impending death for in "this society...its vision of death as the ultimate evil" (Mairs, 1987, p.125) Indeed "most nondisabled people I know are so driven by their own fears of damage and death that they fear contact, let alone interaction" (Mairs, 1996, p.100). The understanding of possibilities and relations to others (Carman, 2005) was diminished to what was objectively measurable, available, and calculable and thus became the referential context of significance for the averageness of society (c.f.Heidegger1962/orig.1927§129) (Elkholy, 2008; Tuttle, 2005; 1996). As Mairs (1996) explains,

...I learned that ...people who seem most hostile to my presence are those most fearful of my fate (p.102).

Lewis (2005) argues this function of *das Man's* indifference; the indifferent places in significance were characterized within Heidegger's (1962/orig.1927) 'representability' in that any one *Dasein* would be represented by another (*Vertretbarkeit*). Representability is actually constitutive of *being-with-another*; *Dasein*, within limits must be another *Dasein* (*das andere sein*) (c.f. Heidegger 1962/orig.1927.§239-40). We are 'each other' in the sense of taking one's place, once left. *das Man* exists only in those possibilities, which are occupied by 'anybody' as

objects of the undifferentiated (Lewis, 2005). Yet Heidegger (1962/orig.1927) is explicit in his discussion of indifferent solicitude, the degrading of *Dasein's* selfhood (care) the removal of selfhood (*sorge abnehmende*) through its thrown tendency to inhabit such possibilities in common,

...It [would], as it were, take away care from the other and put itself in his position in concern; it [would] *leap-in* (*Einspringen*) for him. This kind of solicitude [took] over for the other that which he [was] to concern himself. The other [was] thus thrown out of its own position...This type of solicitude, which [*leapt in* and took] away 'care,' [was] to a large extent determinative for being-with-another, and pertain[ed] for the most part to concern with the ready-to-hand (Heidegger, 1962/orig.1927, p.158).

So indifferent *being-with* was the "relation of intersubstitutability between *Dasein* [through] exchange of place within the symbolic world" (Lewis, 2005, p.26). The motion of substitution as anonymous others projected the possibilities which constituted an individual's symbolic identity and thereby reduced differences to those which were both quantifiable and acceptable to society (Elkholy, 2008; Lewis, 2005). Indeed indifferent *das Man* was little more than a subject-position in the world of significance. Yet Heidegger (1962/orig.1927) understands the danger of reducing identity to solely that of significance, or reducing *Dasein* to the 'in-order-to' and the object of *Besorge*⁶ (Elkholy, 2008; Lewis, 2005). Heidegger (1962/orig.1927) argues that such related to inauthentic *leaping* which focussed not on 'the other' but the matter at hand; the material, objectively present situation which reduced the other to the status of 'thing'

...Concern takes over what [was] to be taken care of for the other. The other is thus displaced; steps back so when the matter has been attended to, he takes it over as something finished and available or disburden himself of it completely. In this concern the other has become one who is dependant and dominated even if this domination is a tactic one and remains hidden from him (Heidegger,1962/orig.1927, p.158).

By comparison, the more authentic mode of solicitude, *Fürsorge*, would see *Dasein* leaping ahead, not concerned with the specific task confronting the other but with the

⁶ Division of *Sorge* which related to concern of materiality

other's existential well-being in the rootedness of their lived situation. Such "concern which essentially pertains to authentic care, the existence of the other and not to what which it takes care of, helps the other become transparent to himself *in* his care and *free for* it (Heidegger, 1962/orig.1927, p.158).

Thus the indifferent *Being-with* of *das Man* deprives society of one's own. The singularity of *Dasein* was lost in the symbolic order for it was so appropriated in the external public self; it had lost sight of itself. Becoming dominated by norms, "in the oblivion of normalcy" (Mairs, 1996, p.29) and transformed into a sterile identity of the masses, it has been rendered an average expectancy and an everydayness that obscured possibilities and history through the tranquillisation (Tuttle, 1996) of commonality.

...The world as it is currently constructed does not especially want--and plainly does not need--me in it...I find that my physical and social environments send the message that my presence is not unequivocally either welcome or vital (Mairs, 1996, pp.87-88).

The self of *Dasein*, then, through *Mitsa-sein* was inseparable in its relations with the 'Being' of others through its traditional or *average* possibilities. However, I would ask; Why has *Dasein* failed to relate to individuals belonging to different traditions and possibilities? Why was it apparently impossible to respond to these others, for as Heidegger argues, recognition is rooted in the pre-reflective understanding ontologically grounded in the 'Being' of the world one *shared* with others?

A central theme of Critical Disability Studies suggests that disability is not a fundamental question of health or medicine but one of politics, power and power(lessness). In modern Western society, it was manifested through the production

of economic and social power relations of capitalism (Devlin & Pothier, 2006).

Heidegger (1962/orig.1927) suggests,

...Being-with-one-another concerned itself as such with averageness, which is the existential character of the 'They'...which maintains its factically in the averageness of that which belongs to it, of that which it regards as valid and that which it [did] not...to that to which it grants success and that which it denies (p.164-65).

The "care of averageness revealed an essential tendency in *Dasein*, a levelling down of all possibilities" (Heidegger, 1962/orig.1927, p.165) of 'Being' within its world. Indeed such 'levelling-down' has become increasingly evident though liberalism and globalisation's institutional priorities. Critical Disability Studies further argues that *das Man*, through the political priorities of liberalism, has been unwilling / unable to pursue substantive equality. The current promotion of the welfare state had *das Man leaping-in*; precluded substantive empowerment through undifferentiated uniformity (Minda, 1995) There was no doubt that "I will always be a figure of pity, scorn [and] despair" (Mairs, 1996, p.105) for *disability* is constrained by current policy and institutionalization through normative assumptions of misfortune and poor luck rather than an equal 'Being' (Devlin & Pothier, 2006) in society.

Elkholy, (2008) in discussing Scheler's (1874-1919) opposition to Heidegger's (1962/orig.1927) concept of *Being-with-others*, suggests Scheler claimed it was solipsistic⁷ as it was unclear why he "should assume that all *Dasein's* share a world" (cited p.125) However, Elkholy (2008) rejected this by insisting Heidegger's everydayness convincingly proved *Dasein*, initially found itself, through the 'care' of its activities, needs and expectations, embedded in the contextual significance of the surrounding world alongside others. Equality then, was not about evoking pity or charity that focused on survival rather than participation (Krogh & Johnson, 2006).

⁷ A view that the 'self' is all that exists and / or can be known

Indeed Critical Disability Studies highlight the need of movement to a human rights perspective (Rioux & Valentine, 2006) a *leaping-ahead*, which removed the hierarchy of 'difference' or the indifference of *das Man*. Nobody was 'impaired' on one's own, it was a perversion something added, an unasked-for supplement contributed by disciplinary knowledge and power, (Allen, 2005). It was impossible for an individual to be considered disabled without reference to a constructed, privileged *normal case* and so disability was nothing more than an artefact of the discipline (knowledge) that measured and maintained it through the acceptance of social convention (Allen, 2005; Frazee, Gilmore & Mykitiuk, 2006).

Life though is not the expression of some pre-given timeless human nature, but the "nexus of practices, assumptions, prejudices, habits and traditions which made up everyday experiences and action" (Clark, 2000, p.27). Central to the establishment and maintenance of ableism are "the notions of the normative" (Campbell, 2009, p.4) and a "constitutional divide between perfectly naturalised humanity and the aberrant, the unthinkable, quasi-human hybrid and therefore non-human" (Campbell, 2009, p.6). These together provide the basis for the scaling or ordering of individuals through the mechanism of difference (Campbell, 2009). Indeed labelling the disabled individual as deficient or inadequate privileges a particular understanding of 'normalcy, consistent with the dominant groups of society and in actuality required the marginalized to be rendered 'outcast' in order to reduce their 'threat' (Linton, 1998) keep them "beyond the realm of civility" (Campbell, 2009, p.11) by holding their "lives...as cheap, even expendable" (Mairs, 1996, p.99).

All disabled people confront the daily challenges of the ableist paradigm when negotiating daily existence in a world that erased their value in varied degrees and form (Campbell, 2005) yet “what I wanted...was to maintain a sense of control” (Mairs, 1996, p.118). The power and domination of undifferentiated *das Man* exploited the power differential through control to protect majority interest and the determination of resources and standards of possibilities and acceptance through social and economic criteria (Linton, 1998) as engagement with such *identities* provoked political resentment (Campbell 2005). Butler (1993) argued that such regulation and normative projection provided a strategy of social abjection producing “the *unsymbolizable* the *unspeakable*, the *illegible*” (p.190) and sequestered from those with full citizenship and “demarcating the threshold of humanity” (Agamben 1998, p.8).

However, Overboe (2007) argues “subjectivity stemmed from desires rather than continually response to the non-disabled normality” (p.29). Perhaps as Overboe (2007) recommends, the way forward was to “reconsider [the] reliance on humanism or (re)claim the possibility that the desires from the ‘bare life’ as a state of exception [could] create [in] new potentialities” (p27). Indeed Guattari (1996) claims that everything that existed before the opposition between subject and object; representation and production, the confines of categorization was *desire* and created different subjectivities, “without reference to persons, organs, material flow or semiotic flows” (cited Overboe, 2007, p.28). One’s singularity should be the result of exposures that turn its back on the dichotomy of disability / non-disability; turning one’s back on the “normative shadows” (Overboe, 2007, p.29).

The Publicness of Injustice

Heidegger (1962/orig.1927) maintains the self, or the 'I', a terminology suggestive of individuality, is in its everyday existence a social entity. Indeed *Being-in-the-world* and *Being-with-others* is a social commonality (Tuttle, 1996), *Dasein* is not causally interactive with items or a 'substance confronting' its external world but has an intimate connection, a conceptual link (McDonough, 2006,) "constituted by its involvement in the world" (McDonough, 2006. p.23). Not to be understood as a single, 'who am I' over and against 'others, Heidegger (1962/orig.1927) expresses the philosophical position of humankind *in-the-world-with-others* as a priori development of the 'public dimension' (*die Öffentlichkeit*) which was not only intersubjective but constitutive of its very Being (Tuttle, 2005; 1996).

Everyday *Dasein* lives largely as being-oneself (*Selbstein*), yet is not isolated as an individual 'I-myself' but indistinguishable from the 'anybody.' As a non-atomonistic version of the self or sociality, it is available to others in publicly encounter-able world of common language, meaning, practice and manipulation (Cavalier, 1998). It is further understood by reference to the common particulars of the common world and through allowing the 'anybody' to appropriate and make relevant, social expectation and norms through the public dimension (Cavalier, 1998; Tuttle, 1996). While such public 'possession' is presupposed in the very nature of *Dasein* through expected normal interaction with others, the 'anybody' reveals a primordial relation of implied sociality; an existential condition of public expectation and social function. *Being-with* suggested 'common competence' of *Dasein*; through deductive capacity to present 'common possibilities' for *being-with-others* is one's own-most possibility of self (Tuttle, 2005). Through the assumptions of how *Dasein* constitutes its relations to

others, the pre-interpreted manner of interaction is central to *Dasein's* position as it precipitates social custom and culture, common usage and institutional behaviour. However within the '*distantiality*' of the undifferentiated *das Man*, 'anybody' is largely obscure, for its focus is the existence of 'particularities' of its ego, forgetting both the multiplicity of roles within the socially pre-defined and possibilities of *Being-in-the-world* and that 'authentic existence' is simply a modification of public sociality (Ree, 1998; Tuttle, 1996).

The transformation of this public self through *das Man's* insistence of conformity becomes the defensive necessity of the undifferentiated. "Deviations from the fully human condition.... the afflicted body is never simply that...it is thought to be broken...in need of militaristic response... to whip it back into shape or thus [be] a potential menace to the bodies around it" (Mairs, 1996, pp.47-48). Indeed stepping outside the undifferentiated becomes difficult; *das Man* is happier, following the crowd; the actuality of the masses allows obscurity and a defence against striving for possibilities (Cavalier, 1998; Elkholy, 2008; Tuttle, 2005). "Distantiality, averageness and levelling down are ways of Being for the '*They*' constitute what is known as 'publicness'...controls every way in which the world and *Dasein* is interpreted" (Heidegger, 1962/orig.1927, p.165). Bonded to 'this anybody' *das Man* claims "legitimacy in conformity, of the force of unified chanting masses" (Tuttle, 1996, p.70) that accept the power and normalcy of the situation (Tuttle 1996).

So '*They*' become the agent of *das Man* obscuring free possibilities of individual and groups through the "deflection of its own most possibilities of 'Being' other than the *one*" (Tuttle, 1996, p.70). In the appropriation of the public self, *das Man* loses sight

of itself through the domination of norms and in a moral sense is transformed into an entity, assumed necessary for whatever the current purposes served (Cavalier, 1998; Ree, 1998; Tuttle, 2005; 1996). It is necessary to comply with what 'They' wanted, judged and perceived as fitting (Elkholy, 2008; Tuttle, 2005, 1996) therefore "depriv[ing] *Dasein* of its answerability" (Heidegger, 1962/orig.1927, p.165) and thus allowing the 'other' to vanish into "inconspicuous domination" (Heidegger, 1962/orig.1927, p.164). Indeed "the world to which I am a material witness [is] a difficult one to love...my infinitely harder task...is to conceptualize not merely a habitable body but a habitable world; a world that wants me in it"(Mairs, 1996, p.63). Constant reference and deferment then, to the 'They' diminishes *das Man* as it dissolves into the impersonal, authoritative agent of its own-most possibilities. 'They' would seek to offer the foundation of the 'self' and the normative content, in the triumphs of averageness and liberation from the 'anybody' in accepting public interpretation and absorption in the world (Cavalier, 1998; Elkholy, 2008; Tuttle, 2005, 1996). So the "dictatorship of *das Man* is unfolded" (Heidegger, 1962/orig.1927, p.164).

Society has set standards of public interpretation, evaluation and methodologies for dealing with disability without much knowledge or experience of it. Survival for the disabled individual, without damaging their 'subjectivity' is contingent on coping with resistance through the dismissal of the consequences of ignorance (Mee, 1999) For the visibility and reality of disability was the basis of all social comparisons and interaction (Chubon, 1994; Covey, 1998; Smart, 2003) for "difference had consequences" (Mairs, 1996, p.16). Olkin (1999), in describing the salience of her adaptive device in the view of others, argues her scooter completely overshadowed

any personal characteristics for “I got encoded in their memory as a scooter...and they [didn't] remember me” (p.88). Even more pervasive was the “twisted body twisted soul” concept and widely held view that disability has a negative effect on the individuals character for those with disability were “permanently bitter, angry, deviant and hostile” (Smart, 2003, p.91) and therefore in need of isolation. Critical Disability Studies argues that disability has no such ‘essential nature’ but became a consequence solely of what is valued / de-valued, through the publicness of socio-political conjunctures. Also the labelling of disability and the attached hierarchy of stigma are the functions of social organization and social class (Thorn, Hershenson & Romney, 1994) as the benchmarks of assessment (Lee, 2006).

Further, Critical Disability Studies highlights the consequences of the ‘just us’ mentality of the justice system (Devlin & Pothier, 2006). The effect of this embodied theory has tended to de-stabilize the influence of the ‘ivory towers’ and ‘hallowed halls’ in the emerging context of the bottom-up, lived experiences. Thus the disabled individual has found the ability to question the political and philosophical awareness of inequality (Devlin & Pothier, 2006) through systematic structural economic, social, political, legal and cultural inequalities leading to dis-citizenship (Devlin & Pothier, 2006). Indeed, Critical Disability Studies is sceptical of liberalism in its unsatisfactory and insufficient relational understanding of the ‘self’ (Devlin & Pothier, 2006) for “we are governed by this understanding of the undifferentiated being” (Heidegger, 2002/orig.1930, p.30).

The prejudice then, experienced by the disabled individual, in daily interaction with non-disabled people, is at the heart of segregation and oppression. Only through an

understanding of their account of life will the challenges faced and structures impacting on their individuality be properly interpreted (Devlin & Pothier, 2006)

...I am literally diminished by my disability, reduced to a height of about 4'8." consigned to gazing at navels (generally shrouded) other than my own. But diminution is not the whole of it. 'Waist-high' also resonates as 'knee-deep.' This is no piteously deprived state I'm in...but a rich, complicated and utterly absorbing process of immersion in whatever the world [has] to offer (Mairs, 1996, p.18).

Critical Disability Studies then argues that changing patterns of social organization and interpretation would change the concept of disability for there was a duality (of citizenship) involved through societal response and the individual circumstance of the disabled individual (Frazee, Gilmour & Mykitiuk, 2006; Krogh & Johnson, 2006).

Moreover citizenship has relied upon the notion of humanity (Fealy, 2008) and an implied criterion of inclusion. To contemporary Western philosophical traditions, this amounted to able-bodied, rational, autonomous, free, economically productive individuals. Heidegger's (1962/orig.1927) work directly challenges this perception for humanity was no longer tied to normalized categorization (Fealy, 2008) or "an unmoving point of view upon the world"(Mulhaul, 1996, p.39) but was rather, a function of the more primary issue of 'Being.' *Dasein* is existence as apposed to capacities and characteristics attached to value laden 'normals' (Fealy, 2008).

Tong (1999) suggests that increasing one's understanding of the production of discrimination is best done through the understanding of such as it applied to disability because at its core was ableism. Campbell (2009) and Chouinard (1997) both focus on the "conception of ableism as the hub network functioning around shifting interest convergences"(Campbell, 2009, p.6) Linton (1998) includes ableism's insistence that the disabled individual was "somehow inferior to non-disabled people" (p.9). Yet the able-bodied "perfectedness had an illusive core of

circular reductionism" (Campbell, 2009, p.10) in assessing what was and wasn't meant by humankind for disability was 'anybody' capable of "being narrated as outside the norm" (Mitchell, 2002, p.17). For "like all negative terms 'disability' is part of a binary, existing in relation to the privileged opposite; that is, one is 'disabled' only from the point of view of another defined by common social values as 'able'" (Mairs, 1996, p.13).

The formation of ableist relations requires the normate individual, a "social figure through which people [could] represent themselves as definitive human being" (Thomson, 1997, p.8), to depend on the 'self' of the disabled individual is to be "rendered beyond the realm of civility" (Campbell, 2009, p.11). However, Heidegger (1962/orig.1927) maintains that human life must be accountable to the fact that one's *Being-with-others* meant and included those who were equally *Beings-with-us* (Lewis, 2005). So far the 'public self' has generally levelled possibilities and suppressed difference through the imposition of standardization (Tuttle, 2005).

Yet historically disability had remained a reliable signifier of difference; the variation of humanity and in contemporary times had been made a matter of performative interdependency, unduly dependent on those who would solidify social standing through charity (Krogh & Johnson, 2006). The social construction of *deviance* became part of the fiction of the charity industry within capitalism's repertoire of exclusion and operated under the ideological principles that disguised the hierarchical relationship serving the dominant interests of the 'They' (Krogh & Johnson, 2006). Unfortunately *das Man* had been lost in the 'They' for in relinquishing its responsibility to 'others,' it ultimately failed itself for its objective relationship

(*besorge*) of indifference (Elkholy, 2008) and social divisions, denied the reciprocity of its reality with 'others' (Lewis, 2005).

...In a society that [professed] to protect all its members...the normally unconscious attitudes that chill the social climate for people marked out by disability...have deplet[ed] and shrivel[ed] the spirit ... if you want[ed] people to assume responsibility for themselves and this [was] what we should all want for each other, I think you ought not beat them into the emotional ground (Mairs, 1996, p.99).

Genuine unity with others (*Care*) has *Dasein* looking beyond the discriminatory nature and uniform consensus of its undifferentiated state. Yet as this paper has discussed Heidegger (1962/orig.1927) suggests that *Dasein*, through the interaction of its structures, facticity (*Faktizitat*), possibility (*Moglichkeit*) and fallenness (*Verfallen*), is mostly closed-off and unresponsive to any such authentic behaviour for "its basic state... is the structure that shows us in the movement of *falling*" (p.221). *das Man's* need for communal 'processes' exposes the discriminatory and oppressive nature of the undifferentiated in its objectification or othering of disabled individuals. Heidegger's philosophy however offers the chance to dissect the relevance, significance and determination of the *originating mechanisms* of these concepts for *Dasein* questions not the result of human activity and association but rather the primordial 'Being' of individuals to offer understanding, appreciation and insight into behaviours and activities peculiar to the human experience.

In offering an understanding of *existence*, Heidegger, through the exposition of the irony of human interaction, provides both an uncompromising commentary and solution to the contemporary mire of ineptitude, oppression, insensitivity and uncaring behaviours involved in the social '*Othering*' of the lived experience of disabled people. The battle from within, the battle for one's own authenticity, one's own most possibility is the only foundational requirement for social acceptance, understanding

and equality. Indeed, self-knowledge 'is' the understanding of the other; the oppression of *others* has resulted in humankind oppression of itself. Moreover, socialization through the habitual indifference of ableist commonality, public conformity and average expectation has robbed the community of diversity for the fear of difference has provided for the 'withering' of individuality, creativity and significance.

In acknowledging the realities and social basis for discrimination and oppression of *others*; the drive and commotion of contemporary 'necessities' of life, the passions for wealth, success and recognition, Heidegger argues that *Dasein* has been distracted from the singular 'need' of *Being-in-the-world-with-others* in the common endeavour of striving towards an authentic existence. By focussing on the primordial issue of 'Being' rather than the functions of power, and domination created through the ableist assignations of difference, the philosophy reveals the culpability of society in the *othering* of disabled individuals (and other marginalized groups) in its artificial distinctions between potential and actuality. It is time for humanity to accept the obligations and responsibility for the lived experience of all '*others*' for *Dasein* is essentially for the sake of others (Heidegger, 1962/orig.1927, p160) which defines the journey to authentic existence as resting in the acceptance of difference and the elimination of *Otherness*.

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